Yadigar N. Imamverdiyev

Reliable information security in an interconnected and interdependent world requires close cooperation between states. However, there are some obstacles for effective cooperation of states in this area, first of all, the strategic interests of states should be taken into account. This is a very complex issue, and as a result, only limited forms of international cooperation and regulation in the field of information security are known. This article proposes a model for the formation of international coalitions in the field of information security (pp.14-20).

Keywords:information security, international coalition, coalition formation, hierarchical cooperative games, coalition sustainability.
DOI : 10.25045/jpis.v10.i1.02
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